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Colonialism in the Polish Eastern Borderlands 1919-1939 
Christoph Mick, University of Warwick 
 
 
'Colonialism is a relationship between an indigenous (or forcibly 
imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental 
decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and 
implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often 
defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with 
the colonized population, the colonizers are convinced of their own 
superiority and their ordained mandate to rule.'1 (Jürgen Osterhammel) 
 
Colonialism is a set of unequal power relations between a dominant centre and its periphery. 
This unequal relationship is complemented by the unequal legal status of the group 
dominating the centre and the indigenous population in the colonies. We speak of 
colonialism when the territories at the periphery of an empire or state are (1) subjected to 
economic exploitation (or an attempt at exploitation), and (2) ruled directly or indirectly from 
a distant metropolis dominated by an ethnic group different to the ethnic group or groups 
living in the peripheral territory. This may or may not be accompanied by the settlement of 
members of the ethnic group dominating the metropolis. (3) An integral part of colonialism 
is the existence of a colonial discourse, a 'complex of racial or cultural stereotypes, to 
legitimate metropolitan subordination'.2 
It is common practice to differentiate between four types of colonialism: settler colonialism, 
exploitation colonialism, surrogate colonialism and internal colonialism. In settler 
colonialism, large numbers of people from the centre emigrate to the colony with the 
intention of staying and cultivating the land. Exploitation colonialism involves the emigration 
of far fewer people; the goal here is to extract as many resources as possible from the colony 
and to transfer them to the centre. Surrogate colonialism is when the colonial centre 
promotes the emigration and settlement of groups which do not belong to the dominant 
ethnic group in the centre. Internal colonialism is a relatively new term, first used in the 1950s 
and 1960s. It refers to the uneven structure of power and uneven development of different 
regions within a single (nation) state with the centre exploiting the periphery.  
The classic period of European colonialism stretched from the beginning of the 15th to the 
                                                          
1 J. Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (Markus Weiner Publisher: Princeton 2005), p. 16. 
2 M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 
(University of California Press: Berkeley 1975), p. 30. 
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mid-20th century, but in recent years the term 'colonialism' has been increasingly applied to 
certain relations within Europe itself. Nazi policy in Eastern Europe during the Second World 
War, centre-periphery relations in land empires and even the policy of nation states towards 
other ethnic groups have all been called 'colonial'.  
Historians applying the term colonialism to continental Europe often refer to partitioned 
Poland as a Russian, Prussian/German and Austrian colony.3 This essay touches on this 
subject but will mainly focus on the question whether the newly independent Second Polish 
Republic pursued a colonising policy in its eastern provinces. I will argue that Polish actions 
in the eastern borderlands had some colonialist traits but that these were more the policies 
of a nationalising state. 
Polish politicians did not have to study the overseas colonial policy of Britain, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Portugal or Spain but could take their own imperial past and their recent 
experiences with imperial centres as guide when developing a policy for the eastern 
territories of the new Polish state.4 It is therefore useful to look at Poland first as a potential 
colonizer and a potential colony prior to 1914, before turning to the question whether the 
term 'colonialism' can be applied to the policies pursued by the Second Polish Republic in 
its eastern provinces.  
 
1. Partitioned Poland – a Russian, Austrian and Prussian/German colony? 
In the Russian Empire, Poles experienced discrimination, were ruled by a distant metropolis 
and were the objects of a colonial discourse in the imperial centre. This would speak for a 
'colonial' relationship between the Russian Empire and its Polish provinces. But matters 
were more complicated. By 1900, Warsaw and Łódź had become two of the Empire's 
economic powerhouses. The centre bought industrial products from the periphery. This does 
not fit in well with the concept of the economic backwardness of a (primarily agrarian) colony 
and its exploitation by an industrially developed centre. In this respect, the Austrian 
acquisitions of Polish territory looked much more like a colony. The Crown land Galicia and 
                                                          
3  K. Japs and J. Surman (2012), 'Galicja Postkolonialna cz Postkolonialnie? Postocolonial Theory 
Pomiędzy Prymoiotnikiem a Przysłiwkiem', Historyka: Studia Metodologiczne, 42, pp. 7-35. B. Kundrus 
(2006), 'Kontinuitäten, Parallelen, Rezeptionen. Überlegungen zur "Kolonialisierung" des 
Nationalsozialismus', WerkstattGeschichte, 43, pp. 45-62. J. Zimmerer (2005), 'The Birth of the Ostland 
out of the Spirit of Colonialism: A Postcolonial Perspective on the Nazi Policy of Conquest and 
Extermination', Patterns of Prejudice, 39, pp. 197-219.  
4  For example R. Dmowski (1903), Myśli nowoczesnego polaka  (Lwów). See also, W. Benecke (1999), 
Die Ostgebiete der Zweiten Polnischen Republik. Staatsmacht und öffentliche Ordnung in einer 
Minderheitenregion 1918-1939 (Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau), pp. 11 f.. 
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Lodomeria was poor, industrially underdeveloped and a key market for commodities 
produced by Austrian and Bohemian industry. But if economically Galicia resembled a 
colony more than Russian Poland did, politically the situation was very different. After 1867, 
there was a transfer of power from the imperial centre, Vienna, to Galicia, which left the 
Polish elites in charge of the Crown land with its ethnically mixed population. While certain 
Russian and Austrian policies towards Poland had a colonial dimension, some of these 
policies do not fit the definition. 
Historians of imperial Germany have applied the concept of colonialism to the policy of 
Prussia and the German Empire towards their Polish provinces.5 The way politicians, 
journalists and intellectuals (especially those linked to the Ostmarkenverein) talked about 
the Polish provinces of the German Empire bears a strong resemblance to the colonial 
discourse common in Europe at the time. In this discourse, the Polish population was 
symbolically 'sub-alternised'. Polish culture was viewed as inferior to the hegemonic German 
culture, the Polish provinces were described as backward. This backwardness was 
explained by the supposedly flawed 'national character' of the Poles. Many degrading 
stereotypes of Poles were propagated in Germany, all aimed at denying Poles the right to 
their own state. Such views were not only held by the German authorities, the East Elbian 
agrarians and the right-wing commentators but also by democrats and liberals who, in the 
1830s, had celebrated Polish insurgents against Russian rule as 'fighters for your and our 
freedom'. German rule in these 'borderlands' was now justified as a civilising mission. 
German politicians and intellectuals argued that progress was being brought to Poland from 
outside, as the result of German settlement. According to this view, the Polish nation 
consisted of lazy, backward peasants and self-opinionated noblemen whose frustrations 
erupted from time to time in futile insurrections. The term Polnische Wirtschaft (Polish 
economy) – coined in the 18th century – became synonymous with poor governance and 
administration, economic inefficiency and backwardness. Authors like Gustav Freytag or 
Karl Emil Franzos argued that the modernisation and Europeanisation of the 'uncivilised 
East' – dubbed 'semi-Asia' by Franzos – depended on the adoption of German culture. In 
the inter-war period, the German Ostforschung went even further and insisted that the 
existence of any culture in the east was the result of previous German colonisation.6 In the 
                                                          
5 K. Kopp (2012), 'Gray Zones: On the Inclusion of Poland in the Study of German Colonialism', in M. 
Perraudin and J. Zimmerer (eds), German Colonialism and National Identity (Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge), pp. 33-44 
6 K. Kopp (2009), 'Reinventing Poland as German Colonial Territory in the Nineteenth Century: Gustav 
Freytag's Soll und Haben as Colonial Novel', in Robert L. Nelson (ed.), Germans, Poland, and Colonial 
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Weimar Republic, the widely held opinion was that Poland was a 'state for a season' 
(Saisonstaat), which would eventually collapse. 
The German Empire was a nationalising state. Efforts to dislodge the residual loyalty to 
France in Alsace-Lorraine and germanise the Polish-speaking population went hand in hand 
with promoting the settlement of ethnic Germans in the empire's border regions. In 1886, 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck set up the Königlich Preußische Ansiedlungskommission in 
den Provinzen Westpreußen und Posen, which encouraged Germans to settle in the 
provinces, a policy which aimed to change the ethnic composition in the eastern border 
regions. The legal discrimination of Poles followed. Germans wishing to acquire land 
received subsidies while obstacles were increasingly placed in the path of Poles attempting 
to buy land. From the 1860s onwards, Polish culture came under massive pressure. By the 
end of the century, German had replaced Polish as the language of instruction, even in 
primary schools.  
These are all good arguments for applying the term 'colonialism' to the German policies in 
its Polish territories. There are, however, some counter-arguments. The German Empire 
was a state governed by law with a functioning (albeit weak) parliament, the Reichstag. This 
made the systematic legal discrimination of the Polish population difficult (but not 
impossible). Poles had the same political rights as other citizens of the German Empire and 
could send their own deputies to the Prussian Diet and the Reichstag. The boundaries 
between Germans and Poles were not clearly defined and could easily be transgressed, the 
adoption of German culture was sufficient to make a German out of person born a Polish 
speaker. Even a superficial look at the German colonies in Africa shows that life for Poles in 
the eastern provinces of the German Empire differed fundamentally from the situation of the 
population in the German overseas colonies. Even if the discourses and the view of German 
superiority bear a striking resemblance, the status of Poles in the German Empire was 
incomparably higher than that of the indigenous population in the colonies, and the level of 
coercion and violence Poles experienced much lower than that exerted by German 
colonizers in their overseas colonies. More than anything else Bismarck wanted loyal 
subjects, the liberals desired a national homogenisation which would include a 
Germanisation of Poles while the radicals in the Ostmarkenverein wanted to establish a 
German dominance over the Polish population. The policies were contradictory and 
ultimately unsuccessful, not least because of the resistance and self-organisation of the 
                                                          
Expansion to the East (Palgrave and Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke 2009), pp. 11-37. 
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Polish population. 
 
 
2. Polish 'colonial' traditions  
For the Polish elites, Polish culture was not the problem but the solution for Eastern 
European 'backwardness'. They viewed Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians similar to 
the way Poles were perceived in Germany: as culturally inferior, incapable of state building 
and in need of someone who would lead them towards European civilisation, progress and 
modernity. While the German elites believed they brought culture and civilisation to Poland, 
the Polish elites in turn believed that they had brought culture and progress to Ukraine, 
Lithuania and Belarus, the former eastern borderlands of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. The borderlands (in Polish: kresy) discourse was a strange combination, in 
which fascination and longing for the 'wild' and 'natural' in these borderlands was 
commingled with a belief in the backwardness and inferiority of the East and its peoples.7 
Poland had cultivated its own form of orientalism since the late 19th century.8  
Can the relationship between Ukrainians and Poles in the interwar period be described as 
a relationship between an indigenous majority and a minority of foreign invaders? Were the 
fundamental decisions affecting the life of the majority made in the interests of the minority? 
Before the partitions the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth pursued a colonial policy of sorts. 
The eastern part of the Commonwealth was dominated by immigrant Polish magnates or 
indigenous noblemen who had assimilated to Polish culture. The territories in question came 
under Polish control between the 14th and 16th centuries. Most of the land was acquired 
peacefully by Poland as a result of the Polish-Lithuanian Union; only Red Ruthenia, later 
known as East Galicia, was conquered (in the 14th century). Since this time Poles had settled 
in the eastern borderlands. The indigenous Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belarusian elites were 
co-opted into the Polish noble nation. The multi-ethnic Polish nobility developed an ideology, 
known as Sarmatism, which traced its origins back to the Sarmatians, an ancient people 
who had populated the steppe territory in Southern Ukraine and Southern Russia. In this 
way the nobility not only 'otherised' the Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Belarusian but also the 
                                                          
7 Kresy bezeichnete ursprünglich nur die Gebiete, die zum Großfürstentum Litauen gehörten, im 20. 
Jahrhundert wurde der Begriff auf alle östlichen Gebiete der Zweiten Polnischen Republik angewand, die 
eine nichtpolnische Bevölkerungsmehrheit hatten. 
8 E. Said (1978), Orientalism. (New York: Pantheon Books). B. Bakuła, 'Colonial and Postcolonial Aspects 
of Polish Discourse on the Eastern "Borderlands", in J. Korek (2007), From Sovietology to Postcoloniality. 
Poland and Ukraine in the Postcolonial Perspective (Stockholm: Södertörns Högskola), pp. 41-59. 
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Polish peasantry. The peasants were viewed as inferior, irrespective of nationality. This 
changed after the Polish peasants were 'admitted' to the Polish nation at the end of the 19th 
century. 'Otherisation' was now done along ethnic and religious lines. 
The social and economic dominance of the Polish nobility outlasted the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth and survived in Prussia/Germany and the Austrian and Russian Empires. 
In 1914, most landowners were Polish, towns were either Polish, Jewish, Russian or multi-
ethnic compositions, while the peasantry was Ukrainian, Belarusian or Lithuanian. After the 
Polish partitions, some members of the Polish elites became agents of the new centres, but 
many also participated in uprisings, lost all or part of their property, suffered arrest or exile 
to Siberia, or emigrated.  
It is therefore difficult to sustain the argument for the period between 1795 and 1918 when 
Poland did not exist as a state but was ruled from Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg. While 
Polish elites in Austria-Hungary had a sort of semi-autonomy from the 1860s, the Russian 
government did not act in the interests of the Polish nobility.  
Did the supposed Polish colonizers believe in their own superiority and their mandate to 
rule? Polish elites viewed Ruthenians (the Ukrainian-speaking Greek Catholic or Orthodox 
population in the borderlands) not as a nation but as an ethnic category. They held them to 
be incapable of building their own nation state or of developing their own high culture and 
believed that Ukrainians, like the Belarusians and Lithuanians, had to choose between 
assimilation to the Russian or to the Polish nation and would pick up Polish or Russian 
culture on the way. But there were early signs that the Ukrainian people would not be 
absorbed by either Poland or Russia. In 1848, the newly formed Ruthenian (the official 
Austrian term for the Greek Catholic Ukrainian-speaking population of Austria) Council 
protested against Polish demands for political and cultural autonomy for the Crown land 
Galicia and Lodomeria. The Ruthenian Council petitioned for a partition of the Crown land 
into a Ruthenian (eastern) and a Polish (western) part. Polish politicians were all the more 
surprised as, 18 years earlier, students of the Greek Catholic seminary in Lviv had supported 
the Polish November uprising. In previous centuries, Ruthenian noblemen had joined the 
Polish noble nation and their descendants considered themselves gente Ruthenus, natione 
Polonus, i.e., of Ruthenian origin but of the Polish nation. In the emergence of a Ruthenian 
movement Polish politicians believed that they could detect the hand of Austrian intrigue. 
They believed that the Austrian governor of Galicia, Franz Graf Stadion, had 'invented' the 
Ruthenian nation to fight off Polish national aspirations. In the second half of the 19th century, 
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Russophile sentiments among the Ruthenian population in East Galicia replaced the Polish 
option as the most important hindrance to Ukrainian nation building. The Russophile 
movement was strongest in the 1870s and 1880s but finally – in a step that was as surprising 
to the Polish as to the Russian elites – a Ukrainophile option won out, with the Ukrainians 
living in the Russian Empire and the Ruthenians of Austria-Hungary viewed as parts of a 
single – Ukrainian – nation. 
The strength of the Ukrainian national movement in East Galicia did not fundamentally 
change the perceptions of the Ukrainian population. As in 1848, the Polish population was 
taken by surprise when, in November 1918 after the collapse of Austria-Hungary, western 
Ukrainians attempted to create their own state on territory which the Poles claimed for their 
own, future, Polish state. In autumn 1918, Ukrainian politicians in Lviv proclaimed the 
Western Ukrainian People's Republic, formed the Ukrainian Galician Army and fought for 
several months against Polish troops for the control of East Galicia. The Polish press 
referred to Ukrainian state building as a German-Austrian-Ukrainian conspiracy,9 a 
“Ruthenian-Prussian-Austrian attack”10 and as an “action of alien, German inspiration”11. 
The Polish delegation in Paris tried to convince the Allies that the right of self-determination 
did not apply to the Ruthenians/Ukrainians and that East Galicia belonged to Poland.12  
Polish authors attempted to differentiate between Ukrainians and Ruthenians. According to 
their view, the term 'Ukrainian' stood for a mere handful of politicians bribed by the German 
and Austrian governments, while the Ruthenian peasants remained loyal to Poland.13 The 
national democrats who dominated the early Polish governments were especially vehement 
in denying the existence of a Ruthenian or Ukrainian nation. Their main newspaper Słowo 
Polskie argued that 'people' had used the divide et impera strategy of the Austrian 
government to call themselves a nation and make historical claims:  
'On this fiction they base their plan – with an impertinence rarely seen in history 
– to create their own independent state for a nation which historically does not 
exist'.14  
                                                          
9  'Niech żyje, niepodległa i zjednoczona!' Gazeta Poranna, 2/11/1919. Przed listopadową rocznicą (Z kół 
obywatelskich), Gazeta Lwowska, 30/10/1919. 
10  W rocznicę listopadową? Słowo Polskie, 2/11/1919. 
11  Dziennik Lwowski, 23/11/1928. 
12  The Polish Foreign Ministry to the Polish Embassy in London, 15/10/1921; AAN (Archiwum Akt Nowych), 
Ambasada RP w Londynie, 433, pp. 10-12. P. Żurawski vel Grajewski (1995), Sprawa Ukraińska na 
konferencji pokojowej w Paryżu w roku 1919 (Warszawa). 
13  Słowo Polskie, 23/11/1928. 
14  'Lwowski Listopad', Słowo Polskie, 1.11.1920. 
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The Ukrainian coup d'état was called an 'assault' (zamach), often with the adjunct 
'treacherous'.15  
The discourse about the childlike naivety of the Ruthenian peasants, deceived by German 
funded Ukrainian agitators, was accompanied by numerous reports on Ukrainian atrocities. 
These reports aimed to exclude Ukrainians from the group of civilised (European) nations. 
They also provided an explanation for Polish violence against these 'barbarians' and were 
an additional argument for allowing Poland to rule over territories ethnographically 
Ukrainian.16 
 
3. The 'colonized' as 'colonizers' 
I will now turn to the inter-war period and focus on the Ukrainians, the largest national 
minority in the Second Polish Republic. In Volhynia and the three south-western 
voivodships, the majority of the population were Ukrainian. It should not be forgotten that 
Poland was a new state and faced the difficult task of integrating four, highly diverse regions 
with different historical, political and economic traditions. The Second Polish Republic was 
neither a nation state nor a federation nor an empire. It had elements of all three. The 
borders of Poland in the west were confirmed by the Allies early on, but the country's eastern 
borders were the result of wars and changed considerably between the end of the Great 
War and the Peace Treaty of Riga on 18 March 1921. Poland was a 'work in progress'.  
Controlling an independent state was a new experience for Polish politicians. Even in Galicia 
after 1867 the Polish elites had always to reckon with imperial interference. Now Poles were 
no longer the object of minority policies; instead the new Polish government had to develop 
its own minority policy. But the authorities did not have a free hand. Poland was obliged to 
sign a minority treaty with the League of Nations to have its territorial acquisitions confirmed 
by the victorious powers.  
The Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918/19 had alienated the western Ukrainians. The Polish 
government came down heavily on those who had resisted the establishment of Polish 
power. By 1921 50,000 former soldiers of the Ukrainian Galician Army and 20,000 Ukrainian 
civilians had passed through Polish internment camps or prisons.17 After their military defeat, 
                                                          
15  Recollections of a Polish fighter, 1918; TsDIAL (Tsentral'nyj Derzhavnyj Arkhiv L'vivskoii Oblasti), f. 837, 
op. 1, spr. 71, ark. 44-45. 
16  J. Białyania-Chołodeck (1926), 'Boje o Lwów', in W obronie Lwowa i kresów wschodnich (Lwów), p. 29. 
17  Ukrainian population losses in East Galicia (1921), TsDIAL, f. 462, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 33-36. 
9 
 
 
the Ukrainian political leaders placed their hopes on the western Allies, believing that the 
'right of self-determination' would also be applied to the western Ukrainian territories. But 
Poland was too important as a counterweight to Soviet Russia. Provisionally at first and 
finally in 1924, the Allies recognised East Galicia as part of Poland. As long as the final 
decision had not been made, Ukrainian civil servants refused to swear an oath of loyalty to 
the new Polish state, and they lost their jobs in consequence. The majority of East Galician 
Ukrainians refused to participate in the census, and Ukrainian parties called successfully for 
a boycott of the elections to the Polish parliament. The Ukrainian-Polish war and the 
repression and discrimination of Ukrainians in the immediate post-war period strengthened 
the animosity against Poland in the Ukrainian population. A militant arm of the Ukrainian 
national movement organised the armed resistance against integration into Poland, and the 
first terrorist attacks on Polish politicians and representatives of the Polish state followed.  
How could the eastern borderlands be made Polish or at least loyal to Poland? There were 
three potential ways to 'Polonise' the eastern provinces: by making Ukrainian, Belarusian 
and Lithuanian peasants into Poles (national assimilation); by making them into loyal citizens 
of Poland (state/civic assimilation); or by changing the ethnic composition of the region by 
settling ethnic Poles in the borderlands and/or promoting the emigration of the non-Polish 
population. While the national democrats were either for national assimilation or – where 
this failed – exclusion from the Polish nation, the Piłsudski camp were, in principle, prepared 
to recognise the existence of the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian nations and wanted 
to win over these groups for the Polish state. In theory, the two political sides looked quite 
dissimilar, but in practice there was often not much difference. Both camps did not want to 
give up the borderlands, believed in the superiority of Polish culture and the necessity of 
Polish leadership. Even after the peace treaty with Soviet Russia in Riga on 18 March 1921, 
Piłsudski entertained hopes that it would be possible to build a federation of the states of 
the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under Polish leadership, with an independent 
Ukrainian state on the territory of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic.18 
The first government of the Second Polish Republic (formed on 11 November 1918) had 
high hopes that it would be possible to assimilate Ukrainians and Belarusians. They believed 
                                                          
18 On the different concepts see W. Paruch (1997), Od konsolidacji państwowej do konsolicaji narodowej. 
Mniejszości narodowe w mysli politycznej obozu piłsudzykowskiego (1926-1939) (Lublin: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodkowskiej). Benecke, Die Ostgebiete, pp. 10 ff. C. Schenke (2004), 
Nationalstaat und nationale Frage: Polen und die Ukrainer 1921-1939 (Hamburg, München: Dölling und 
Galitz Verlag), pp. 47 ff. 
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in but did not exclusively rely on the attractiveness of Polish culture. Did the 'colonial centre' 
and the dominant minority reject cultural compromises with the colonised population? The 
reality was complicated, and there is no straightforward answer to this question. 
The cultural differences between Poles and Ukrainians were not fundamental; the languages 
are related, in East Galicia both Poles and Ukrainians were Catholics – but as Greek 
Catholics, the Ukrainians had their own churches, priests and ritual language. Thus, while 
emphasising the superior culture and the historical rights of Poles was an element common 
to colonial discourse, Polish authors perceived Poles and Ruthenians as parts of a single 
family. Polish newspapers referred to the Ukrainian 'assault' in November 1918 as an 
attempted fratricide. This was in striking contrast to Polish perceptions of the Jewish 
population, whose 'otherness' was viewed by influential national democrats as 
unchangeable and whose integration in the Polish nation was deemed impossible. 
Marriages between Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics were quite common. While the 
towns had a 'Polonising' effect, many Roman Catholics living in Ukrainian villages 
assimilated to Ukrainian culture. 
Even if in the three south-eastern voivodeships the Poles were Catholics like the Ukrainians, 
the Greek Catholic denomination became a key factor separating Poles and Ukrainians in 
the region. Greek Catholic priests exercised an enormous influence over the Ukrainian 
peasantry and were indispensable for communicating the national message to the 
population.19 Unsurprisingly, the Polish government attempted to reduce the influence of the 
Greek Catholic clergy. In 1920, hundreds of Greek Catholic priests were interned in Polish 
prisons.  
The religious boundaries between Poles and Ukrainians were clearer in Volhynia, where 
Poles were Roman Catholic and Ukrainians were Orthodox. Here the Polish government 
tried to cut the link to the Russian Orthodox Church by creating an Autocephalous Polish 
Orthodox Church. De-Russification of the Orthodox Church went hand in hand with 
Polonisation.20 Religious difference, however, did not always translate into different national 
affiliation. Hundreds of thousands of people in the borderlands did not identify with any 
specific nation. In Volynhia and the neighbouring voivodeships about 700,000 answered the 
question about their nationality in 1931 with 'we are from here' (in Polish, they were referred 
                                                          
19  Report of the police in Skałat (copy), 26/5/1921; TsDIAL, f. 146, op. 8, spr. 4909, ark. 49-51. 
20 On Volhynia see Benecke, Die Ostgebiete,pp.  199 ff. Schenke,  Nationalstaat und nationale Frage, pp. 
188 ff. 
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to as tutejszi, i.e., those from here).21 The national affiliation of groups such as the Latynniki, 
Ukrainian-speaking Roman Catholics (about 100,000) was contested. Were they Ukrainised 
Poles or Polonised Ukrainians? In 1921, a prominent Polish national democrat 
recommended using Roman Catholic priests to encourage the conversion of 'Poles of Greek 
Catholic faith' to the Latin rite. The propaganda should be aimed at school children, persons 
in mixed marriages, Greek Catholics with Roman Catholic ancestors, those wanting to buy 
land from Poles or marry a Polish woman, persons who had a Polish godfather or required 
financial assistance. Mixed marriages should be prevented at all costs.22 There was 
pressure on Ukrainians to convert to Roman Catholicism. The Greek Catholic archbishops 
protested to the League of Nation that public jobs or licenses for trading were linked to Greek 
Catholics changing their denomination.23 
The Polish government also tried other ways to strengthen the 'Polish element' in the 
borderlands. In the immediate post-war period, American relief organisations funded 207 
orphanages in Poland, but not a single one was placed under Ukrainian control. The 
intention was clear; Polish orphanages would bring children up as Poles, Ukrainian 
orphanages would make them Ukrainian. To counteract this, Ukrainian organisations 
founded their own Ukrainian orphanages. But initially they were not very successful. In 1923 
only 29 orphanages caring for 1404 children were under Ukrainian control.  
The aim of the Polish state was either – as the national democrats wished – to Polonise the 
Ruthenians or to transform them into loyal citizens of Poland. The Pilsudski camp would 
have been content with the latter. The education system was key for achieving both goals. 
Ukrainian schools were subjected to severe pressure. When the Lviv professor Stanisław 
Grabski became Minister of Education in 1925, he drew up a law, which permitted the 
transformation of most Ukrainian schools into utraquist – bilingual – schools where most 
teaching would be in Polish. Everywhere the Ukrainian language came under pressure. 
Under Austrian rule, Ukrainian had been one of the three languages of administration in 
Galicia; now every official communication had to be in Polish. In the wake of the Lex Grabski, 
the number of monolingual Ukrainian schools was reduced. In 1912, East Galicia had 2400 
Ukrainian primary schools, in 1927 the figure had dropped to 352 and in 1939 it was a mere 
                                                          
21 The number is probably too high as the Polish officials taking the census tried to artificially reduce the 
number of Belarusians by registering them as 'tutejszi'. 
22  The letter from 11 June 1921 fell into the hands of the Greek Catholic Church and was kept in the 
archive of the St. George Cathedral in Lviv, TsDIAL, f. 462, op, 1, spr. 222. 
23  The three uniate archbishops to the Council of the League of Nations in Geneva (probably 1921), 
TsDIAL, f. 462, op. 1, spr. 222, ark. 126-128. 
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144. In Volhynia, there were only eight monolingual Ukrainian schools. The situation was no 
better for secondary schools. There was one Polish secondary school for every 16,000 
Poles. In comparison, there were 230,000 Ukrainians for every Ukrainian secondary 
school.24 
The Ukrainian language disappeared from Lviv University. All Ukrainian chairs were 
abolished and Ukrainian professors lost their jobs as they refused to swear an oath of loyalty 
to the Polish state before the Allies had confirmed Polish sovereignty over East Galicia.25 
The government broke its promise to establish a Ukrainian university – this would have gone 
against the tenets of Polonisation. A secret, private Ukrainian university in Lviv was 
dissolved in 1925. The only way for Ukrainians to acquire higher education was through the 
medium of Polish or to study abroad. In 1925/26, only 1236 students, i.e. a mere 12.2% of 
the total number of students attending the two Galician universities in Kraków and Lviv were 
Ukrainian.26 Many Ukrainians objected to having to study at a Polish-run university, 
preferring to go to Vienna, Prague, Leipzig or Berlin instead.27 
The government also promoted the settlement of Poles in the eastern borderlands. The aim 
of this policy was to secure the borders by strengthening the so-called Polish element in the 
region. Here, the Polish governments could follow the example set by the German Empire, 
which had supported the settlement of ethnic Germans in Posen and West Prussia to 
change the ethnic composition of the provinces. 
In 1920, Polish colonists profited from a land reform which distributed state land and 
parcelled out large estates. Ukrainians received much less land than the Polish colonists, 
and the average size of Ukrainian peasant holdings was much smaller than that awarded to 
Polish peasants. Polish colonisation focussed on regions with good soil and increased the 
Ukrainian land hunger, fuelling the economic pressures arising from an already considerable 
agrarian overpopulation. In the inter-war period, around 170,000 Ukrainians left Poland. In 
1920, the first demobilised soldiers of the Polish Army were settled in East Galicia. They 
received free land and loans at particularly favourable conditions and were also privileged 
                                                          
24  O. Subtelny (2000),  Ukraine: A History (Toronto, Buffalo, London), pp. 438 f. J. Hrycak (2000), Historia 
Ukrainy 1772-1999 (Lublin), p. 190. L’Association de L’Ukraine Occidentale pour la Société des Nations: 
La situation de la population ukrainienne en Pologne, 27/6/1924; TsDIAL, f. 355, op. 1, spr. 28, ark. 1-20. 
25  Hrytsak, Narys Istoriji Ukrajiny, p. 190. Subtelny, Ukraine, p. 192. M. Papierzyńska-Turek (1979), Sprawa 
Ukraińska w drugiej rzeczypospolitej 1922-1926 (Kraków), pp. 220 ff., 257 ff.  
26  Polish Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in London, 27/1/1926; AAN, Ambasada RP w Londynie, 1435, 
pp. 97-98. 
27  Police administration Lviv to the Director of the Police, Reinlender, 18/10/1923; DALO (Derzhavnyj 
Arkhiv Lvivs'kji Oblasti), f. 110, op. 4, spr. 849, ark. 145. 
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in other ways.28 According to Ukrainian estimates, up to 200,000 settlers arrived in Volhynian 
and East Galician villages between 1920 and 1938, while reports by Polish historians only 
list around 100,000 settlers (including families). Another 100,000 ethnic Poles moved to the 
towns and cities. Those who did not become farmers worked for the state or in state 
enterprises as village policemen, railway workers or in local administration. The Polish 
government succeeded in increasing the Polish share of the population in the eastern 
borderlands, but the failure of cultural assimilation meant it did not fundamentally change 
the ethnic composition of the population. The Ukrainian population hated the settlers and 
they became a primary target of attacks.29 
After 1923, moderate Ukrainian parties realised that they would have to compromise to 
improve the material situation of the Ukrainian population and preserve their system of co-
operatives, national organisations and education societies. While they did not give up on the 
final aim of creating a Ukrainian nation state, they were willing to co-operate with the 
government. Militant groups, however, rejected all forms of cooperation with Poland. In 1921 
they founded a Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO), which, in 1929, became the 
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The OUN used terrorist methods to attack the 
Polish state and Poles living in what the OUN perceived to be Ukrainian lands. One of the 
main aims of Ukrainian armed resistance was to prevent compromises being made with the 
Polish government and to prepare the population for a 'Ukrainian revolution'.30  
From 1921 on, the young activists attacked representatives of the Polish state and Polish 
institutions but also moderate Ukrainian politicians. The young militants did everything they 
could to prevent the Ukrainian population from accommodating to life in a Polish state. The 
Polish local and regional authorities were as much opposed to any compromise as the 
Ukrainian nationalists were. The military were among the fiercest opponents of Ukrainian 
autonomy as they viewed the Ukrainian minority as a security risk.  
Polish-Ukrainian relations improved somewhat after Piłsudski came to power in 1926. He 
made Henryk Józefski governor of Volhynia. Józefski used less coercion, preferring to 
achieve his goals with the help of concessions and material privileges. He tried to make 
Ukrainians if not into Poles then at least into loyal Polish citizens by offering greater cultural 
                                                          
28  Papierzyńska-Turek, Sprawa Ukraińska, p. 167. Benecke, Die Ostgebiete, pp. 123 ff. 
29  Subtelny, Ukraine, pp. 428 f. Hrytsak, Historia Ukrainy, p. 188. 
30  J. A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (Littleton/Col.) pp. 19 ff. Subtelny, Ukraine, pp. 443 ff. Hrycak, 
Historia Ukrainy, pp. 198 ff.  
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and religious freedoms and letting Ukrainian peasants profit from the parcelling out of large 
estates. As Timothy Snyder has argued, this was part of a grand scheme aimed at the 
Ukrainian population in the Soviet Union with the goal of winning them over to Poland and 
creating an allied Ukrainian 'buffer' state between Russia and Poland.31 
The credibility and attractiveness of this grand scheme for the Ukrainian population was 
undermined by the attempts of the Sanacja government to separate the nationally less 
mobilised Ukrainians in Volhynia from the East Galician Ukrainians. Neither the national 
democrats nor, at a later date, the Sanacja regime intended to keep the promises given to 
the Allies and create an autonomous Ukrainian region within Poland, uniting all 
ethnographically Ukrainian lands. All Polish governments pursued a divide at impera policy. 
In Volhynia, Ukrainian peasants were forced to join Polish co-operatives, although in East 
Galicia, despite certain administrative restrictions, the Ukrainian co-operative sector was 
allowed to flourish. The authorities also prevented the spread of Ukrainian reading clubs to 
Volhynia. The government promoted the ethnic particularity of the Huzuls and the Lemky 
and tried to draw them closer to Poland.  
The world economic crisis hit the Ukrainian peasants harder than the Polish colonists, who 
received state subsidies. Unsurprisingly, the Ukrainian nationalist movement grew stronger. 
Between July and November 1930, OUN members and supporters carried out 2000 acts of 
sabotage and attacks on estate owners, military colonists and Polish officials.32 In 
September, the Polish government started a punitive expedition using police and army units 
to suppress the rebellion. Punitive actions were based on the principle of collective 
retribution. Entire villages were hit by the so-called 'pacifications' in which Polish police and 
cavalry destroyed villages and reading halls and confiscated Ukrainian property.33 More than 
2000 Ukrainians, many of them young people, were arrested and more than 600 sentenced 
to long prison sentences. After the pacifications had ended, the OUN intensified its terrorist 
attacks on Polish politicians, officials and moderate Ukrainian politicians. Between 1921 and 
1939, UVO and OUN killed 25 Poles, one Russian, one Jew and 36 Ukrainians in 63 attacks. 
In 1931 and 1934, OUN activists killed two prominent Polish politicians, Tadeusz Hołówko 
and the Minister of the Interior Bronisław Pieracki, both of whom had supported a Ukrainian-
                                                          
31 T. Snyder (2007), Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to liberate Ukraine (New Haven, 
Yale University Press). 
32  W. A. Serczyk (1993), 'Die sowjetische und die ‚polnische’ Ukraine zwischen den Weltkriegen', in Frank 
Golczewski (ed), Geschichte der Ukraine (Göttingen), pp. 202-223, here: p.  221. 
33  P. Olijnyk (1995), Zoshyty (Kyjiv), p. 48. 
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Polish compromise.34 
The Second Polish Republic was – cum grano salis – a country governed by law. This  gave 
the Ukrainian elites legal options to continue their nation building efforts. Ukrainians had all 
political rights and their representatives sat in the Polish parliament. Educated Ukrainians 
could not find jobs in the state sector, but they found them in the flourishing Ukrainian co-
operative movement. The Ukrainians countered the Polonisation of state schools by 
founding the education society Ridna Shkola. In 1938, the society had 100,000 members 
and controlled 40 private secondary schools. Prosvita, a Ukrainian education society for 
adults, had more than 360,000 members, a network of reading clubs and published journals, 
calendars and books.35 Between 1935 and 1937, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, 
the most influential Ukrainian party, stopped its policy of categorical opposition in parliament. 
Ukrainian schools profited from the détente, but economically the Ukrainian population did 
not gain much. Autonomy or a land reform benefiting Ukrainians was still out of the question. 
After two years the UNDO ceased its cooperation.36 Two years after Piłsudski's death, 
Józefski was replaced and his more flexible policy in Volhynia was stopped. The Polish state 
handed over 150 orthodox churches to the Roman Catholic Church. Another 190 orthodox 
churches were closed or destroyed. In 1939, only 51 orthodox churches still remained 
open.37 The government now pursued a more active Polonisation policy to 'win back the 
souls' of those tutejszy, Belarusians and Ukrainians, they deemed to be Polish but who had 
lost their Polish identity.38 
When in 1937 some Polish estates were burned down in arson attacks, the government 
again sent troops into Ukrainian villages where they destroyed Ukrainian public buildings 
and beat up Ukrainian peasants.39 In 1938 and 1939, influenced by the Munich agreement, 
and the temporary independence of Carpatho-Ukraine, a number of bloody excesses 
occurred. In Lviv, Polish students beat up Ukrainians, and in the countryside Poles were 
attacked by Ukrainian peasants. The government renewed its 'pacifications'. The principle 
of collective retribution was again applied. Men and women, young and old Ukrainians were 
                                                          
34  Subtelny, Ukraine, pp. 428 ff, 445 f. Hrycak, Historia Ukrainy, pp. 191, 199 f. 
35  Subtelny, Ukraine, pp. 439 f. Hrycak, Historia Ukrainy, p. 195. Papierzyńska-Turek, Sprawa Ukraińska, 
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arrested, chained together and driven through the villages. Some Ukrainian farms were 
destroyed. Ukrainian politicians estimated that at the end of 1938 30,000 Ukrainians were 
being held in Polish prisons. This strengthened the radical nationalist organisations. In 1939, 
the OUN had approximately 20,000 members, but many more Ukrainians sympathised with 
the organisation.40  
 
4. Conclusion 
Are the Polish policies in the Eastern borderlands an example of colonialism? I would 
hesitate to answer this with a straightforward “yes”. If Polish colonialism existed in the 
borderlands, it was neither exploitation colonialism nor surrogate colonialism. The eastern 
voivodeships were the recipient of subsidies from the centre. The region was not drained of 
resources; instead subsidies flowed into the area, and there was no Polish expectation of 
being able to exploit the region in the immediate future. There were also no attempts to settle 
other groups than Poles in the borderlands. Did the presence of a culturally, politically and 
socially dominant Polish population in the borderlands make the relationship 'colonial'? 
Polish settler colonialism was not as straightforward as in the eastern territories of the 
Russian Empire or in overseas colonies. Red Ruthenia and Volhynia had been part of 
Poland or Lithuania since the 14th century. Some of the so-called 'Polish elements' in the 
region were Polonised Ruthenians, particularly members of the Ruthenian nobility. A 
continuous migration of Poles, especially to the towns, had existed even prior to the 
partitions of Poland, and the settlement policy of the Second Polish Republic did not change 
much. 
The Polish policy towards Ukrainians was contradictory. Płlsudski entertained ideas of a 
Ukrainian buffer state or of a federation between a future Ukraine and Poland under Polish 
leadership, while the national democrats pursued a policy of inclusion (of Ukrainians who 
were willing to assimilate) and exclusion (of Ukrainians who continued to support a separate 
Ukrainian national identity). However, the attitude of the Polish elites to the Ukrainian 
population was partly colonial, with Ukrainians perceived as children incapable of ruling 
themselves. Polish culture was seen as superior to Ukrainian culture and the Polish mission 
was to civilise the eastern borderlands. In the Polish imagination, the kresy – the borderlands 
– became a sort of Wild East which the Poles had cultivated and were still cultivating, an 
                                                          
40  The German consulate in Lvviv to the German Foreign Ministry (1939); PA (Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes), Konsulat Lemberg, 54. 
17 
 
 
outpost of European civilisation defended by the Polish nation against the onslaughts of 
barbarism. 
Colonial techniques were applied – like the 'pacifications', the support given to Polish settlers 
and the promotion of military settlements. The settlement policy, however, was the result of 
a failure to assimilate the Ukrainian minority or at least convince them that their future would 
be in Poland and not in a Ukrainian nation state.  
From a Polish perspective, there was no fundamental ethnic difference, which would have 
made it impossible for Ukrainians to become Poles. Poland was not a colonising but a 
nationalising state, and subsequent Polish governments tried to turn Ukrainian peasants into 
Poles or at least into loyal Polish citizens. Where French governments in the 19th century 
had succeeded in making peasants, and inhabitants of Provence, Burgundy or Alsace into 
Frenchmen, the Polish governments failed to turn Ukrainian peasants into Poles. The 
majority of Ukrainians resisted Polonisation, just as they had refused to become members 
of the Russian nation. Polish rule in the eastern borderlands was different from Russian 
colonial rule in Central Asia and Siberia or the overseas colonialism of the western European 
powers where the colonisers came from an ethnically and culturally diverse centre. In the 
Polish case, both groups were closely related and there was a long tradition of co-existence. 
Before 1918, Ruthenian peasants in East Galicia had fared no worse than Polish peasants 
in West Galicia. If Polish rule between 1920 and 1939 acquired a more and more repressive, 
one might say, colonial character, then this was the result of the failed policy of Polonisation, 
of the strength of the Ukrainian national movement, the terror campaigns of the OUN, the 
weakness of the moderate forces in both societies and consequently the unwillingness of 
both sides to compromise. It is not clear how Polish policies would have developed, as the 
German attack on Poland opened a new, far more brutal chapter in which, after genocide, 
mass murder and ethnic cleansing, Polish dominance in the borderlands ended. 
